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INTRODUCTION
From the beginning of the financial crisis through the end of 2010, ap-
proximately four million families lost their homes due to foreclosures.'
While the loss of a home to foreclosure is clearly devastating to the home-
owner, it also affects the neighbors, 2 particularly in common-interest com-
munities where the homeowners are, in a sense, joint venturers in the com-
munity.' First and foremost, studies have shown that foreclosures in a
neighborhood decrease property values.' Sales of foreclosed properties at
fire sale prices reduce values as do homes that are left unsold and aban-
doned. Abandoned homes may stay empty for months or even years. They
may be vandalized, stripped of appliances and fixtures, or occupied by
squatters.' Homeowners in common-interest communities are also affected
when association dues remain unpaid. With fewer homeowners able to pay
association fees to cover maintenance of common amenities, the remaining
* Julia Patterson Forrester, Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of
Law, Dallas, Texas; J.D. 1985, B.S.E.E. 1981, The University of Texas at Austin. Jerome Michael
Organ, Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law, Minneapolis, MN; J.D. 1985, Van-
derbilt University Law School; B.A. 1982, Miami University. We wish to thank participants in the Joint
Program of the Property and Real Estate Transactions Sections at the AALS 2012 Annual Meeting for
their comments. We first discussed this Article after the 2007 Festschrift Symposium honoring Dale
Whitman, and we would like to thank him, in particular, for his comments at the AALS Meeting. Pro-
fessor Forrester thanks Laura Justiss for her assistance as a research librarian and SMU students Timo-
thy Springer, Allyn Hurley, and Blake Redwine for their research assistance. Finally, Professor Forrester
gratefully acknowledges support provided through the A.J. and Ann Van Wynen Thomas Memorial
Endowed Research Award. Professor Organ thanks Debby Hackerson for her assistance as a research
librarian and St. Thomas student Dina Nguyen for her research assistance. Professor Organ also ex-
presses gratitude for the financial support of the St. Thomas Summer Research Grant Program.
I FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xv (2011), available
at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/fcic/fcic.pdf.
2 See G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND
COMMUNITIES 13-21 (2009).
3 See infra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
4 See, e.g., Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage Foreclosures 2
(N.Y.U. Ctr. for Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 08-41, 2008), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract 1270121.
5 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,supra note 1, at 10; KINGSLEY ETAL., supra note 2, at 16.
739
GEO. MASON L. REv.
homeowners end up having to pay more for association fees at the same
time that their property values are declining.'
Among the factors leading to the tidal wave of foreclosures was the
proliferation of very risky home mortgage loans made to borrowers without
the ability to pay, even at the outset.7 In the years leading up to the crisis,
originations of high risk mortgages increased drastically from 12 percent of
loan originations in 2000, totaling about $125 million, to 34 percent of loan
originations in 2006, totaling about $1 trillion.! A number of loan products
that previously were not available or were rare became commonplace.' The
result was a dramatic increase in leverage and reduction in equity that made
residential property ownership within common-interest communities more
risky as an investment than at any time since the Great Depression.
This Article explores one possible private law prescription that may
help common-interest communities avoid the financial disaster associated
with foreclosure epidemics-a financing restriction that would limit (1) the
ability of any homeowner in a common-interest community to borrow ex-
cessively against the value of her home, and (2) the ability of lenders to
make loans that a homeowner does not have the ability to repay. Part I of
this Article begins in the Great Depression with a discussion of Neponsit
Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank,'o ex-
ploring how the case both fostered the development of common-interest
communities and foreshadowed the current crisis in which common-interest
communities find themselves. Part I also discusses reasons why common-
interest communities may have evolved without the inclusion of a financing
restriction. Part II explains the failure of the regulatory system to prevent
the mortgage crisis and outlines recent regulatory changes. Part II also dis-
cusses the advantages of this private law approach in protecting common-
interest communities. Part III analyzes the legal enforceability of a financ-
ing restriction, while Part IV outlines some of the practical challenges to
implementing financing restrictions in the marketplace. Part V sets forth a
proposed financing restriction for integration into the documents for com-
mon-interest communities.
6 See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
7 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xxiii; U.S. DEP'T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV.,
REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE ROOT CAUSES OF THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS 25-26 (2010).
8 U.S. SENATE PERMANENT SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS, WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS: ANATOMY OF A FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 20 (2011) [hereinafter WALL STREET AND THE
FINANCIAL CRISIS].
9 See id. at 21.
10 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938).
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I. NEPONSITAS CATALYST FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF COMMON-
INTEREST COMMUNITIES AND AS PREDICTOR OF THE CURRENT
INSTABILITY WITHIN COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES
The now famous New York Court of Appeals property law decision in
Neponsit both solidified and foreshadowed the future of common-interest
communities. Neponsit involved a claim by the Neponsit Property Owners'
Association ("NPOA") against the Emigrant Industrial Savings Bank
("Bank") regarding past due assessments on a parcel to which the Bank had
taken title through foreclosure." At the time of the decision, the law regard-
ing assessment covenants was unsettled. 2 Historically, courts in New York
had held that assessment covenants-as affirmative covenants rather than
negative covenants-did not "touch and concern" the land, and thus were
not binding on successors," although in the years preceding Neponsit, deci-
sions in lower courts found assessment covenants to be enforceable against
successors. 4 In addition, the case presented the question of whether the
NPOA, as successor to the developer, had "privity" to enforce the assess-
ment covenant against successor owners of lots burdened by the covenant."
11 See id. at 793-94; Stewart E. Sterk, Neponsit Property Owners' Association v. Emigrant Indus-
trial Savings Bank, in PROPERTY STORIES 301, 308 (Gerald Korngold & Andrew P. Morriss eds., 2004).
12 See infra notes 13-14 and accompanying text.
13 See, e.g., Miller v. Clary, 103 N.E. 1114, 1117 (N.Y. 1913) (finding an affirmative covenant to
maintain and operate shaft connected to mill wheel not binding upon successors); Crawford v.
Krollpfeiffer, 88 N.E. 29, 29 (N.Y. 1909) (holding affirmative covenant to contribute to cost of party
wall did not run with the land to bind successors-in-interest); see also infra notes I17-29 and accompa-
nying text for a discussion of the touch and concern requirement.
14 See, e.g., Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Mayer, 294 N.Y.S. 735, 735-36 (App. Div. 1937)
(denying motion to dismiss claim to enforce a lien to recover annual assessment); Lawrence Park Realty
Co. v. Crichton, 218 N.Y.S. 278, 279-80 (App. Div. 1926) (finding assessment covenant to maintain
common parts of development enforceable against successor in interest).
15 Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 797. This question was complicated further in Neponsit because the
NPOA did not hold title to any property in the development. The "common area"-a beach-had been
condemned prior to the case by the City of New York. See In re Pub. Beach, 199 N.E. 5, 5 (N.Y. 1935);
In re Pub. Beach, 17 N.Y.S.2d 2, 3 (App. Div. 1940). The NPOA ultimately received compensation of
$88,162.80 for the beach parcel. Public Beach, 17 N.Y.S.2d at 3. In addition, the City of New York
already had assumed responsibility for maintaining the streets in the subdivision. See Sterk, supra note
I1, at 307. Notably, this assumption of maintenance responsibilities by the City of New York runs
contrary to the modem view that the growth in common-interest communities has arisen partly in re-
sponse to "load-shedding" by municipalities seeking to shift maintenance responsibilities to homeown-
ers' associations. Paula A. Franzese & Steven Siegel, Trust and Community: The Common Interest
Community as Metaphor and Paradox, 72 MO. L. REV. Ill 1, 1112 (2007); James L. Winokur, Critical
Assessment: The Financial Role of Community Associations, 38 SANTA CLARA L. Rev. 1135, 1138-39
(1998).
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The Neponsit court held that the assessment covenant did touch and
concern the land.'" In addition, the court concluded that the NPOA could
enforce the covenant because "in substance, if not in form, there is privity
of estate between the plaintiff and the defendant." 7
The decision solidified the future of common-interest communities by
paving the way for courts across the country to decide that assessment cov-
enants could be enforced not only against original purchasers in common-
interest communities, but also against successors-in-interest who purchased
with notice of the assessment covenant.'" This meant that common-interest
communities, with amenities available to all owners of land within the
community, would have the ability to assess each landowner, including
successor landowners, for the costs associated with maintaining the ameni-
ties without being concerned about free-rider problems resulting in some
landowners incurring disproportionate maintenance costs." By creating a
legal regime in which all involved in a common-interest community could
have certainty about maintenance costs for amenities being shared across all
owners within the community, Neponsit made possible the dramatic expan-
sion of common-interest communities from relatively few as of the 1930s,
to nearly 500 as of 1962, to 15,000 as of 1973,20 and to more than 300,000
today.2'
The decision foreshadowed the future of common-interest communi-
ties because it arose during the Great Depression when banks were taking
title to many properties as a result of foreclosures, 22 a circumstance plagu-
16 Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 797; see also infra notes 117-29 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the touch and concern requirement.
17 Neponsit, 15 N.E.2d at 798; see also infra notes 130-37 and accompanying text for a discussion
of privity.
18 See, e.g., Adaman Mut. Water Co. v. United States, 278 F.2d 842, 849 (9th Cir. 1960); Burton-
Jones Dev., Inc. v. Flake, 117 N.W.2d I10, 117 (Mich. 1962).
19 If assessment covenants were not binding on successors, then over time, as lots change hands,
the dwindling number of original purchasers would bear increasing shares of the maintenance costs
absent voluntary contributions by those successors not legally bound to contribute to the maintenance
costs.
20 Sterk, supra note 11, at 321-22; see also EVAN MCKENZIE, PRIVATOPIA: HOMEOWNER
ASSOCIATIONS AND THE RISE OF RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT 11 (1994).
21 Casey Perkins, Note, Privatopia in Distress: The Impact of the Foreclosure Crisis on Home-
owners' Associations, 10 NEV. L.J. 561, 563 (2010) (citing Industry Data, COMMUNITY Ass'NS INST.,
http://www.caionline.org/info/research/pages/default.aspx (last visited Feb. 22, 2012)) (noting that in
1990 there were 130,000 association-governed communities with 29.6 million residents, but that by
2010 that had grown to over 300,000 association-governed communities in which an estimated 60
million Americans lived).
22 Sterk, supra note 11, at 319; Price V. Fishback et al., The Influence ofthe Home Owners' Loan
Corporation on Housing Markets During the 1930s, at 6 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 15824, 2010), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl5824 (noting that in the first few
years of the Great Depression, from 1929-1933, housing prices fell 30 to 40 percent, resulting in "a
sharp rise in mortgage foreclosures").
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ing innumerable common-interest communities today.' The mortgage crisis
that erupted in 2007, which has precipitated one of the longest and deepest
recessions since the Great Depression, has exposed the surprisingly fragile
financial balance of large numbers of common-interest communities, many
of which have already tipped into a downward spiral of declining home
values, foreclosures, unpaid assessments, and deteriorating common as-
sets.24
At a simple level, the common-interest community is designed to pro-
vide price support to purchasers within a residential community by giving
them confidence that their investment in a home will not be eroded by in-
consistent land uses.25 This is manifested both by restrictions prohibiting
nonresidential or noxious uses of property within a common-interest com-
munity26 as well as by mandates that residential structures comply with
minimum standards for size of house and for aesthetic aspects of the resi-
dential structure and associated landscaping.27
At a more complex level, the common-interest community is designed
to provide added value to purchasers by giving purchasers access to ameni-
ties owned in common that each homeowner can enjoy for a fraction of the
23 See Perkins, supra note 21, at 562, 567-68. Due to a rash of foreclosures, common-interest
communities must defer or even cut homeowners' associations services, such as landscaping services,
for example. See, e.g., Kristen Mack, Associations Suffer as Homeowners Do, WASH. POST, Oct. 5,
2008, at C1, C4; Paul Owers, Foreclosed Units Are Not Paying Association Fees, SUN-SENTINEL (FLA.),
Feb. 24, 2009, at 1, available at http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2009-02-24/business/
0902230565_Icondo-homeowner-associations-property-owners; Elizabeth Razzi, Foreclosures Pick
Pockets ofHomeowners Associations, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 2008, at F5.
24 See, e.g., Perkins, supra note 21, at 562-68. Due to foreclosures, there is a significant increase
in the costs for services homeowners' associations provide as the homeowners' associations deal with
loss of income from foreclosed properties, forcing residents to choose between self-help remedies to
assure maintenance of properties or devaluation of their own property. See, e.g., Margaret Jackson,
Foreclosures Eat at HOAs, DENVER POST, Mar. 22, 2009, at I K; Owers, supra note 23, at 1; Kevin
Turner, Toll of Homeowners Fees, TIMES-UNION (FLA.), July 6, 2009, at C-i; Dennis Wagner, Skipped
Dues Crunch Home Associations, USA TODAY, May 27, 2008, at 4B.
25 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 15, at 1112; see also EDWARD E. CHASE & JULIA PATTERSON
FORRESTER, PROPERTY LAW CASES, MATERIALS, AND QUESTIONS 877-78 (2d ed. 2010) (citing
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.8 & ch. 6, intro. note (2000)); R. WILSON
FREYERMUTH ET AL., PROPERTY AND LAWYERING 583 (3d ed. 2011); Razzi, supra note 23, at F5.
26 See, e.g., Gabriel v. Cazier, 938 P.2d 1209, 1211 (Idaho 1997) (ruling on covenants restricting
"business or trade or offensive or noxious activity" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Boyles v.
Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d 610, 613 (Neb. 1994) (describing a covenant prohibiting junk cars, shacks, and
temporary structures, and restricting type and number of animals).
27 See, e.g., Fink v. Miller, 896 P.2d 649, 651 n.I (Utah Ct. App. 1995) (noting a covenant requir-
ing wood shingles on exterior roofs); Hausmann, 517 N.W.2d at 613 (describing a covenant mandating
minimum size of ground floor living space and prohibiting preconstructed dwellings); Sterk, supra note
I1, at 302 (discussing covenants in Neponsit, which included covenants mandating light colors and tile
roofs for houses).
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cost that would be associated with creating and maintaining such amenities
individually.28
At heart, then, these common-interest communities are inherently
"joint ventures" in the sense that each purchaser buying into the community
is relying on the financial wherewithal of each other purchaser within the
community over time to assure both that each property is well-maintained
(so as not to erode the value of neighboring parcels) and that each property
owner can contribute his or her share to the costs of maintaining the com-
mon amenities that add value to everyone's property.29 One might think that
joint venturers, whose financial security in their "investment" in real estate
within a common-interest community is inextricably linked with the finan-
cial well-being of other joint venturers, might develop a process of assuring
the financial well-being of other joint venturers or at least constraining the
extent to which purchasers may borrow against the value of their parcel.
But with the exception of cooperatives-a somewhat distinctive form of
common-interest community more prevalent in New York City3 -
common-interest communities generally have not imposed any restrictions
on the extent to which purchasers of parcels within the common-interest
communities can borrow against the value of the parcel.3
There would appear to be several reasons for the absence of a financ-
ing restriction constraining the ability of purchasers to borrow against the
value of the parcel. First, the developer of the community typically drafts
the covenants, conditions, and restrictions ("CCRs") that apply within a
common-interest community before any of the owners of parcels within the
community become owners.32 The developers have an interest in selling off
the lots within their development as quickly as possible so that they can
generate cash flow and pay off any financing involved in launching the
development. Developers, therefore, arguably have an interest in proposing
CCRs that are perceived to meet the desires of prospective purchasers (i.e.,
28 See, e.g., Sterk, supra note I1, at 302-03 (discussing the beach and parks that would be availa-
ble to all residents of the Neponsit community); Razzi, supra note 23, at F5. These amenities might
include a park, a pond and beach, a playground, walking trails or other recreational features in suburban
developments with free-standing houses. In condominiums, the amenities might also include services as
well, such as maintenance and security personnel and laundry facilities.
29 See MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 9.
30 Michael H. Schill et al., The Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis
ofHousing in New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 282 (2007) (noting that in a housing cooperative,
the cooperative corporation "typically requires a prospective owner to apply to the board of directors
before a sale can be consummated. The board will require the proposed purchaser to submit detailed
financial statements and letters of recommendation and attend an interview. Cooperative corporations
also frequently limit the amount of debt an owner may secure with his or her shares" in the cooperative
corporation).
31 See id. at 281-82 (noting that the financial constraints of cooperatives are not generally found in
other common-interest communities such as condominiums).
32 Franzese & Siegel, supra note 15, at 1127-29 (discussing the developer's role in "dictating"
CCRs); see also MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 127.
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to "attract" a significant population of prospective purchasers) without un-
duly constraining the universe of such purchasers." Given that a financing
restriction constraining the amount a purchaser could borrow against a par-
cel would inherently limit the universe of prospective purchasers, the de-
veloper likely would not decide to insert a financing restriction because the
short-term "cost" of such financing restrictions to the developer would out-
weigh any perceived value to the purchasers. This outcome is likely even if
a developer had considered the possibility of a financing restriction because
of its potential long-term value to the purchasers of parcels within the de-
velopment.
Second, from the early 1960s through the 1970s, when there was sig-
nificant growth in the development of common-interest communities, "fam-
ilies wishing to buy a home typically went to a local bank or mortgage
company, applied for a loan and, after providing detailed financial infor-
mation and a down payment, qualified for a 30-year fixed rate mortgage."34
Because most lending occurred on a local level and "[t]he local bank or
mortgage company then typically kept that mortgage until the homeowner
paid it off, earning its profit from the interest rates and fees paid by the bor-
rower,"" the lender retained the risk associated with the loan, giving other
homeowners in a common-interest community comfort that their joint ven-
turers were not likely to be over-leveraged on their properties.
Until a significant secondary market developed for the purchase of
conventional loans (loans not insured by FHA or guaranteed by VA), sav-
ings and loans would originate loans from their deposits and hold the loans
until they were paid off or foreclosed. 6 The size of the secondary market
increased with the advent of securitization, which created new sources of
funds for home mortgages. Ginnie Mae and Freddie Mac first securitized
3 See Franzese & Siegel, supra note 15, at 1128 (noting that developers are interested in generat-
ing profit in the short term, not necessarily assuring maintenance of amenities in the long term).
34 WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 8, at 17. During this period most home
purchases were financed by thirty-year, fully-amortized loans. GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN,
REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 11.4, at 949-50 (5th ed. 2007).
35 WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 8, at 17; see also Julia Patterson Forrest-
er, Still Mortgaging the American Dream: Predatory Lending, Preemption, and Federally Supported
Lenders, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1303, 1323 (2006). Depository institutions, primarily savings and loans,
made most home mortgage loans through the end of the 1970s. Id.; see also Cathy Lesser Mansfield,
The Road to Subprime "HEL" Was Paved with Good Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation
and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51 S.C. L. REV. 473, 498 n. 155 (2000) (citing 125 CONG. REC.
29,930 (1979) (statement of Sen. Morgan) (stating that savings and loans made about 60 percent of all
home mortgage loans up to 1979)); David F. Seiders, Recent Developments in Mortgage and Housing
Markets, 65 FED. RES. BULL. 173, 178, 179 tbl.6 (1979) (finding that in 1978 savings and loans made
half of all home mortgage loans).
36 See Forrester, supra note 35, at 1323. Congress created Freddie Mac in 1970 as a secondary
market facility for savings and loans. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 933. At the same
time, Congress gave Fannie Mae authority to purchase conventional home mortgage loans. See Forrest-
er, supra note 35, at 1355.
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home mortgage loans in the early 1970s.n Securitizations in the private
sector began in significant numbers in the late 1970s after rating agencies
began rating privately issued mortgage-backed securities. 8 Only with the
growth in securitization did homeowners in common-interest communities
really need to begin being concerned that financial institutions lending
money would not be indirectly protecting them from over-leveraged joint
venturers.
Moreover, in the 1960s and 1970s, home equity loans were less com-
mon than they became during and after the 1980s, so the risk associated
with heightened leverage from "cash-out" mortgages was less manifest in
the 1960s and 1970s than it would become in the 1990s and 2000s."
Finally, through the 1950s and 1960s, real estate in most areas of the
country was appreciating, but not appreciating so rapidly as to create a fear
of a boom-bust cycle.' The national median home value, without adjusting
for inflation, grew from $7,354 in 1950 to just $17,000 in 1970, a rate of
37 Forrester, supra note 35, at 1325 (citing STEVEN L. SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A
GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION § 1:2, at 1-7 to -9 (Alan D. Ford ed., 3d ed.
2002)); Joseph C. Shenker & Anthony J. Colletta, Asset Securitization: Evolution, Current Issues and
New Frontiers, 69 TEX. L. REV. 1369, 1384-85 (1991). Fannie Mae began securitizing home mortgage
loans in the 1980s. Julia Patterson Forrester, Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac Uniform Mortgage Instruments:
The Forgotten Benefit to Homeowners, 72 Mo. L. REV. 1077, 1082 (2007) (citing Andrew R. Berman,
"Once a Mortgage, Always a Mortgage "-The Use (and Misuse) of Mezzanine Loans and Preferred
Equity Investments, II STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 76, 92 (2005), and Shenker & Colletta, supra, at 1385).
38 See Forrester, supra note 35, at 1326 (citing Kurt Eggert, Held Up in Due Course: Predatory
Lending, Securitization, and the Holder in Due Course Doctrine, 35 CREIGHTON L. REV. 503, 537
(2002), and Comm. on Bankr. & Corporate Reorganization of the Ass'n of the Bar of the City of N.Y.,
Structured Financing Techniques, 50 BUS. LAW. 527, 537 (1995)).
Total home equity debt in 1981 was $60 billion, but by 1991, it had increased to $357 billion.
U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/GGD-93-63, TAX POLICY: MANY FACTORS CONTRIBUTED TO
THE GROWTH IN HOME EQUITY FINANCING IN THE 1980S, at 12 fig.4, 14 fig.6 (1993). The growth rate
for home equity loans from 1981 to 1991 was on average about 20 percent each year, while other con-
sumer debt grew by only 4% per year during the same period. Id at 1. Among the reasons for the in-
crease in home equity financing were changes in tax law that made home equity interest deductible and
other consumer interest nondeductible, appreciation in home values, deregulation in the financial ser-
vices industry, and aggressive marketing by lenders. See id. at 1, 19. See generally Julia Patterson For-
rester, Mortgaging the American Dream: A Critical Evaluation of the Federal Governments Promotion
of Home Equity Financing, 69 TUL. L. REV. 373 (1994) (discussing reasons for the increase in the
amount of home equity financing). In 1989, the median down payment for purchasing a residential
home was 20 percent-by 2007, the median down payment had declined to 9 percent, meaning home
purchasers were significantly more leveraged. See Dennis Cauchon, Why Home Values May Take Dec-
ades to Recover, USA TODAY, http://i.usatoday.net/news/graphics/housing priceshome prices.pdf (last
visited Feb. 22, 2012) (including chart showing median down payment for home purchases in 1989 and
in 2007).
40 See Historical Census of Housing Tables: Home Values, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/census/historic/values.html (last revised Oct. 31, 2011).
746 [VOL. 19:3
MORTGAGE LOAN REGULATION
appreciation of less than 5 percent per year. 4 ' Because this was a period of
relatively stable land values, neither developers nor purchasers had reason
to be concerned significantly about the profound price deflation reflected in
the current "boom-bust" cycle and the corresponding increase in foreclo-
sures from having properties that were "upside-down" or "underwater." 42
Thus, when the majority of CCR documents were being created and
recycled around the country,4 3 there were few reasons for developers to
consider a financing restriction and few reasons for purchasers of parcels
within a common-interest community to have serious concerns about the
financial stability of their other joint venturers. Purchasers could rely on the
existing financial mortgage regime to constrain excessive financial risk-
taking by residential property owners and did not need to consider whether
to amend CCR regimes to constrain the financial flexibility of parcel own-
ers within the common-interest community.
As a result, the system of CCRs in place throughout much of the coun-
try evolved in a way that gave purchasers within common-interest commu-
nities a significant independence and autonomy regarding the extent to
which they wanted to use their parcel as a financial resource by borrowing
against the value of the parcel." This independence and autonomy is largely
responsible for the present chaos many common-interest communities are
experiencing as significant numbers of homeowners in the last decade took
advantage of a rising market aided by generous financing/refinancing op-
tions resulting in excessive leverage in many situations. 45 The next Part of
this Article explains in more detail the regulatory structure for home mort-
gages in the 1990s and 2000s and describes why that regulatory structure in
a changing economic environment failed to protect the average owner with-
in a common-interest community from the financial excesses of his or her
joint venturers.
41 Id.; see also Cauchon, supra note 39 (including chart showing average home price between
1950 and 2008 adjusted for inflation, which showed appreciation of about one-half of one percent per
year).
42 Between 1979 and 2002, the percentage of mortgages that were delinquent or in foreclosure
hovered between roughly 5 percent and 7 percent, but by 2008 the percentage of mortgages that were
delinquent or in foreclosure had skyrocketed to 10 percent. See Cauchon, supra note 39 (including chart
showing percentage of delinquent mortgages). The percentage of delinquent mortgages grew even worse
in 2009, rising as high as 14 percent by the end of 2009. Julie Haviv, Mortgage Delinquencies Rise to
Nearly 14 Percent, REUTERS (Mar. 25, 2010, 5:43 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/03/25/us-
usa-financial-mortgages-idUSTRE6203UA20100325. As of 2009, nearly one-quarter of homes were
considered "underwater"-meaning that the amount owed on the mortgage was more than the value of
the home. Lee Anne Fennell & Julie A. Roin, Controlling Residential Stakes, 77 U. CHI. L. REv. 143,
147 (2010) (internal quotation marks omitted).
43 MCKENZIE, supra note 20, at 43-44, 145 (describing the extent to which CCR documentation
was "recycled" during the period of dramatic growth in common-interest communities).
4 See Schill et al., supra note 30, at 282 (noting that condominium agreements generally do not
include the financial restrictions found in cooperatives).
45 See Cauchon, supra note 39.
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H. THE FAILURE OF THE REGULATORY STRUCTURE TO PROTECT
HOMEOWNERS IN COMMON-INTEREST COMMUNITIES
A. Regulatory System of the 1990s and 2000s
The federal and state regulatory regimes governing home mortgage
lending in the 1990s and the early part of this century were grossly ineffec-
tive. The proliferation of securitization greatly increased the availability of
subprime credit. For various reasons, lenders made home mortgage loans
that borrowers did not have the ability to repay,' and when falling real es-
tate values made it difficult for borrowers to refinance or sell their homes,
the huge rash of foreclosures began.47 Federal and state regulation failed to
prevent lenders from making loans to borrowers that the borrowers could
not afford.
In response to concerns about the proliferation of predatory lending
practices,48 Congress passed the Home Ownership and Equity Protection
Act ("HOEPA") of 1994.49 HOEPA required additional disclosures for
"high-cost" loans, as defined by the Act."o In addition, HOEPA prohibited
certain unfair terms in high-cost loans, including prepayment penalties in
certain circumstances,' increased interest rate on default,52 balloon pay-
ments less than five years after loan closing," and negative amortization.'
It also prohibited lenders from engaging "in a pattern or practice" of mak-
ing high-cost loans without regard to the borrower's ability to repay."
HOEPA, however, was narrow in its scope, excluding purchase-money
mortgages, reverse mortgages, and home equity lines of credit." Further-
more, lenders could, and did, avoid the requirements of HOEPA by making
loans with interest rates and fees just under the trigger amounts for a high-
46 See infra note 79.
47 See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 391-92.
48 See id. at 76; see also Forrester, supra note 35, at 1316; Forrester, supra note 39, at 443.
49 Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151-58, 108 Stat. 2160,
2190-98 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
50 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa) (2006) (amended 2010). The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act ("Dodd Frank") amended the definition and added new prohibitions and require-
ments. See infra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
51 Id. § 1639(c).
52 Id. § 1639(d).
53 Id § 1639(e).
54 Id. § 1639(f). A loan that provides for unpaid interest to be added to principal, either by its
terms or at the option of the borrower, is called a "negative amortization" loan because the principal
initially increases rather than being paid down. See NELSON & WHITMAN, supra note 34, at 954.
5 15 U.S.C. § 1639(h).
56 12 C.F.R § 226.32(a)(2) (2011).
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cost loan," making the Act ineffective to combat problems in the subprime
mortgage market.
Beyond having inadequate legislation at the federal level, the federal
government preempted states' ability to enforce effective state legislation to
a great extent. The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Con-
trol Act" preempts state usury ceilings on any "federally related mortgage
loan" secured by a first lien on residential real estate.5 ' Thus, with some
exceptions, states are not allowed to regulate interest rates on first lien
home mortgage loans.' The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act
("Parity Act") preempted state laws that restrict alternative mortgage
transactions,62 including adjustable rate mortgages ("ARMs"), loans with
balloon payments, and negative amortization loans. As a result, lenders
could lure homeowners into loans that were initially affordable, but had
back-loaded costs, such as loans with no down payment, with an initial low
teaser interest rate that would escalate after a couple of years, with only
interest due for an initial period, or with negative amortization. In fact, the
Federal Reserve estimated that three-quarters of securitized subprime loans
originated between 2004 and 2006 were ARMs with low teaser interest
rates that would escalate after two or three years.'
In addition to federal statutes that preempted state law, federal regula-
tory agencies preempted state consumer protective measures.65 The Office
of Thrift Supervision ("OTS") issued regulations in 1996 that preempted
state laws "affecting the operations of federal savings associations,"' in-
57 See Legislative Solutions to Abusive Mortgage Lending Practices: Joint Hearing Before the
Subcomms. on Hous. & Cmty. Opportunity & Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit of the H. Comm. on Fin.
Servs., 109th Cong. 37 (2005) [hereinafter Hearing on Legislative Solutions], available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-1 09hhrg29453/pdfICHRG-1 09hhrg29453.pdf (statement ofStella
Adams, Board Member, National Community Reinvestment Coalition) (explaining the downside of not
including certain premiums and penalties in the trigger); U.S. DEP'T OF TREASURY & U.S. DEP'T OF
Hous. & URBAN DEV., JOINT REPORT ON RECOMMENDATIONS TO CURB PREDATORY HOME MORTGAGE
LENDING 85 (2000), available at http://archives.hud.gov/reports/treasrpt.pdf; Forrester, supra note 35, at
1317.
58 Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12
U.S.C.).
59 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a(a)(1) (2006) (internal quotation marks omitted).
6 Id. § 1735f-7a.
61 Pub. L. No. 97-320, §§ 801-807, 96 Stat. 1469, 1545-48 (1982) (codified as amended in scat-
tered sections of 12 U.S.C. § 3801).
62 12 U.S.C. § 3803 (amended 2010).
63 See id. § 3802(1) (defining "alternative mortgage transaction" (internal quotation marks omit-
ted)). Dodd Frank amended the definition of"alternative mortgage transaction." See infra note 156.
6 See Truth in Lending, 73 Fed. Reg. 1672, 1674 (proposed Jan. 9, 2008).
65 See 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(a) (2005).
6 Id. The regulations were issued pursuant to the Home Owners' Loan Act. See generally 12
U.S.C. §§ 1461-68. Dodd Frank eliminated the OTS, giving authority to regulated savings and loans to
the OCC. See infra note 96.
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cluding state laws that imposed requirements regarding licensing, credit
terms, loan fees, disclosure requirements, origination, and interest rate ceil-
ings.'6
Subsequently, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency ("OCC")
issued a regulation preempting state laws governing mortgage lending as
applied to national banks and their operating subsidiaries.' The regulation
preempted state law limitations on licensing and registration, insurance
requirements, loan-to-value ratios, amortization, payments, term, escrow
accounts, disclosures, due on sale clauses, and other matters.' In addition,
OCC regulations gave the OCC exclusive visitorial authority over national
banks.7 ' The OCC, thus, had exclusive authority to initiate either adminis-
trative or judicial proceedings to enforce state law against national banks as
well as against their operating subsidiaries.7 '
The federal government preempted state law, but failed to provide a
strong alternative.72 The Federal Reserve had the power to set prudent lend-
ing standards applicable to all mortgage lenders but failed to do so. 71
In addition to a weak federal regulatory scheme and extensive federal
preemption of state regulatory regimes, the federal government failed to
enforce even those laws it had available to prevent predatory lending and
other practices that eventually led to high foreclosure rates. 74 The FTC had
authority to enforce HOEPA and other statutes aimed at protecting consum-
67 12 C.F.R. § 560.2(b). The regulation did not preempt state laws that "only incidentally affect
the lending operations of Federal savings associations," such as contract and commercial law, real
property law, tort law, and criminal law. Id § 560.2(c). However, the regulation provided that it
"occupie[d] the entire field of lending regulation for federal savings associations," id. § 560.2(a), and it
applied to operating subsidiaries of federal savings associations as well, id. § 559.3(h)(1).
68 Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. 1904, 1917
(Jan. 13, 2004) (codified at 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (2005)). The OCC described its regulations as having the
same preemptive effect as the OTS regulations. See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lend-
ing and Appraisals, 68 Fed. Reg. 46,119, 46,129 n.91 (proposed Aug. 5, 2003); News Release, Comp-
troller of the Currency, OCC Issues Final Rules on National Bank Preemption and Visitorial Powers
(Jan. 7, 2004), available at http://www.occ.treas.gov/static/news-issuances/news-releases/2004/nr-occ-
2004-3.pdf.
69 12 C.F.R. § 34.4(a).
70 12 C.F.R. § 7.4000(a)(3). Visitation includes "inspection; superintendence; direction; [and]
regulation." Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, 396 F. Supp. 2d 383, 401 (S.D.N.Y.
2005) (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Youngstown v. Hughes, 6 F. 737, 740-41 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1881))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
71 See Bank Activities and Operations; Real Estate Lending and Appraisals, 69 Fed. Reg. at 1897-
1900.
72 See Forrester, supra note 35, at 1362-63.
7 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at xvii, 76.
74 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO-04-280, CONSUMER PROTECTION: FEDERAL AND STATE
AGENCIES FACE CHALLENGES IN COMBATING PREDATORY LENDING 36 (2004) [hereinafter GAO
REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING], available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04280.pdf.
750 [VOL. 19:3
MORTGAGE LOAN REGULATION
ers in the home mortgage arena." However, the FTC and other federal
agencies focused their enforcement efforts on the biggest cases-those
"that [would] have the most impact, such as those that [could] result in
large settlements to consumers or that [would] have some deterrent value
by gaining national exposure."76 Thus, smaller actors could continue with
impunity. State attorneys general were limited in their ability to enforce
state laws prohibiting unfair mortgage lending practices because of federal
preemption,77 and homeowners themselves did not have a remedy in many
circumstances."
B. Proliferation of Risky Loans
For various reasons, brokers and originators had incentives to make
loans that borrowers did not have the ability to repay, even at the outset."'
Because HOEPA was a relatively weak response to problems in the sub-
prime mortgage market, because states were limited in their ability to regu-
late, and because regulatory enforcement was lacking, the regulatory re-
gime then existing did not prevent lenders from making loans that borrow-
ers were not able to repay.
The number of risky loans increased dramatically in the early 2000s.'o
Some loans were risky because payments were "back-loaded." For exam-
ple, many ARMs had initial low teaser interest rates that would escalate
after two or three years, resulting in much higher payments after the interest
75 Other federal statutes the FTC used in enforcement actions included the Federal Trade Com-
mission Act ("FTC Act"), 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006), the Truth in Lending Act ("TILA"), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1601-1665 (2006), the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act ("RESPA"), 12 U.S.C. § 2603
(2006), and the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act ("FDCPA"), 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (2006). See GAO
REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 74, at 106 app. I.
76 GAO REPORT ON PREDATORY LENDING, supra note 74, at 40.
77 See Forrester, supra note 35, at 1362.
78 Homeowners' remedies were limited by the holder in due course doctrine, which gives a holder
of a negotiable instrument, who meets certain requirements, immunity from personal defenses, such as
fraud in the inducement. Id. at 1329-32.
79 One of the reasons that borrowers and lenders entered into foolish financing arrangements was
their ability to benefit while imposing costs on others-the problem of moral hazard. Loan originators
profited from making loans to borrowers who did not have the ability to repay. The originators earned
fees for originating loans, but did not face the risk of loss from default and foreclosure because the loans
were sold on the secondary market. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N, supra note 1, at 425 (dissenting
statement); Julie Forrester, The Subprime Lending Crisis: How Did We Get Here?, 39 QUAD 37, 37, 39
(2008). Issuers and purchasers of mortgage backed securities relied on rating agencies' assessment of
the risk of the securities rather than conducting any due diligence. See FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM'N,
supra note 1, at 426 (dissenting statement).
80 See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
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rate reset. Option ARMs allowed a borrower to choose whether to make a
payment that included some principal, to pay accrued interest only, or to
pay less than the amount of interest accruing each month and add that un-
paid interest to the loan.82 Lenders often required little or no down pay-
ment.13 Homeowners who did have equity in their homes could cash out
that equity with a home equity loan or home equity line of credit.' These
loan products made it more likely that the borrower would default" and
more likely that the loan would be "underwater" if the property failed to
appreciate or if it lost value. When the real estate bubble burst, home values
in many areas plummeted.
Other loans were risky because borrowers were not required to show
that they had sufficient income to make the payments. Many loans were
"'low doc' or 'no doc' loans" because borrowers were not required to sub-
mit documentation of income or assets." The use of stated-income loans,
sometimes called "liar loans," allowed borrowers to state their income
without any lender verification." Many of the borrowers did not in fact
have the income necessary to pay. But rising home prices masked the prob-
lems with these loans8 because borrowers could refinance or sell the home
to pay off the loan. When the real estate bubble burst, borrowers could not
sell their homes or refinance underwater mortgages without bringing cash
to the table. Thus, the foreclosure tidal wave began.
The rest of the story is now well known as real estate foreclosures in-
creased drastically beginning in 2006, and have continued at high levels. In
response to the crisis, Congress made a significant overhaul of regulation of
home mortgage loans as discussed below in Part II.C.
S1 ee WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 8, at 19-20. The Federal Reserve
estimated that 75 percent of securitized subprime loans originated between 2004 and 2006 were ARMs
with low teaser interest rates. See supra note 64 and accompanying text; see also Forrester, supra note
79, at 37 (discussing loans with back-loaded payments).
82 See WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 8, at 22.
8 See id. at 23.
8 Id at 22-23. See generally Forrester, supra note 39, at 381-87 (discussing the risks of home
equity loans).
85 Studies have shown that a high loan-to-value ratio increases the risk of default and foreclosure.
See, e.g., John M. Quigley & Robert Van Order, Explicit Tests of Contingent Claims Models of Mort-
gage Default, 11 J. REAL EST. FIN. & ECON. 99, 104 (1995).
86 WALL STREET AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 8, at 23. "[F]rom 2000 to 2006, the
percentage of Alt A loans with less than fill documentation of the borrower's income or assets rose
from about 60% to 80%." Id (citing U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-848R,
CHARACTERISTICS AND PERFORMANCE OF NONPRIME MORTGAGES 14 (2009), available at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09848r.pdf).
87 Id. at 24 (internal quotation marks omitted).




The Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
("Dodd Frank")" changed the landscape of federal regulation of home
mortgage lending. The Act addresses many areas of financial regulation,'
but of particular importance in the arena of home mortgage regulation are
the creation of the new Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection, limita-
tions on federal preemption of state consumer financial protection laws,
requirements that lenders confirm a borrower's ability to repay, and prohi-
bitions on steering to higher interest rate loans."
Title X of Dodd Frank established the Bureau of Consumer Financial
Protection as an independent agency within the Federal Reserve System.92
The Bureau is charged with regulating consumer financial services, includ-
ing home mortgages, "for the purpose of ensuring that all consumers have
access to markets for consumer financial products and services and that
markets for consumer financial products and services are fair, transparent,
and competitive."" In particular, the Bureau is charged with enforcing fed-
eral laws that prohibit "unfair, deceptive, or abusive" practices.94 In addi-
tion, the Act makes clear that the Bureau's powers under federal law do not
preempt state consumer protection provisions that are more protective,95 and
it limits the ability of the OCC to preempt state consumer protection laws.96
Finally, Title X gives states the power to enforce the rules and regulations
of the Bureau as well as their own laws.97
Title XIV of Dodd Frank, the Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory
Lending Act, reworks federal regulation of home mortgage lending." Un-
like HOEPA, many of its provisions apply to all home mortgage loans, not
simply to high-cost loans. Title XIV prohibits fees that vary based on any
loan term other than principal amount." Therefore, fees cannot be used as
89 Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
90 Dodd Frank creates a new structure to oversee and promote financial stability in the financial
services arena, id. tit. 1, 124 Stat. at 1391, makes changes to the regulatory framework for banks and
thrifts, id. tit. III, 124 Stat. at 1520, regulates derivatives, id. tit. Vil, 124 Stat. at 1641, and regulates
credit rating agencies, id. tit. IX, subtit. C., 124 Stat. at 1872, among other provisions.
91 See infra notes 92-106 and accompanying text.
92 Dodd Frank § 1011(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5491(a) (Supp. IV 2010)).
9 Id. § 1021(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5511(a)).
94 Id § 1031(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5531(a)).
95 Id § 1041(a) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5551(a)).
96 Id § 1044 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 25b). The Act eliminates the OTS, which had previously
supervised thrifts, and places supervision of thrifts under the auspices of the OCC. Id. § 312(b)(2)(B)
(codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5412(b)(2)(B)). See generally Forrester, supra note 35, for a discussion of the
problems of federal preemption of state consumer protection laws in the context of home mortgages.
97 Dodd Frank § 1042(a)(1) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 5552(a)(1)).
98 Id. tit. XIV, 124 Stat. at 2136-45 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
99 Id § 1403 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639b(c)(1)).
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an incentive to steer borrowers to more expensive loans. It requires lenders
to make "a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the con-
sumer has a reasonable ability to repay the loan."'" For violations of either
the anti-steering provision or the ability-to-pay provisions, Dodd Frank
gives borrowers a defense in a foreclosure or other collection action in the
form of a claim for recoupment or set off.o' Thus, Dodd Frank creates a
remedy for the homeowner for violations of these provisions.
Dodd Frank also includes new prohibitions and new disclosure re-
quirements.'O2 For example, it restricts prepayment penalties, 03 and it pro-
hibits single premium credit insurance and document provisions that require
arbitration, among other prohibitions." Finally, it revises the definition of a
high-cost mortgage to lower the interest rate and fee triggers,' and adds
new prohibitions and requirements for high-cost mortgages.'"
Dodd Frank imposes significant new limitations on home mortgage
lending. The jury is still out on how effective this new regulation will be
and how well it will be enforced. It does create a new agency to enforce
home mortgage regulations, allows states to enforce both state and federal
regulations, and creates a new defense to foreclosure for violations of anti-
steering and ability-to-pay provisions. However, Dodd Frank does not give
the neighbors any remedy to enforce violations of law that may contribute
to the likelihood of a foreclosure in the neighborhood. A financing re-
striction would provide that type of protection.
D. A Remedy for the Neighbors-Advantages of a Private Law Approach
Financing restrictions in the CCRs of common-interest communities,
would give homeowners and homeowners' associations some control to
prevent foolish financing decisions of their neighbors. Developers could
100 Id. § 1411 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(1)). The borrower must have a reasonable ability to
pay insurance premiums, taxes, and other assessments as well. Id. The Act has provisions defining how
ability to pay is determined in the case of nonstandard loans, including certain variable interest rate
loans, interest-only loans, and negative amortization loans. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6)). For
example, in determining ability to repay, lenders must consider ability to repay a fully amortized loan,
even if the terms of the loan provide for interest-only or for deferral of principal or interest. Dodd Frank
§ 1411 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(a)(6)(C)). In addition, the Act defines a "qualified mortgage" and
creates a presumption that the loan meets the requirement for ability to repay. Id. § 1412 (codified at 15
U.S.C. § 1639c(b)). A fully-amortized, fixed-rate loan is among the types of loans that can be qualified
mortgages. Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(b)(2)(A)(iv)).
101 Id. § 1413 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1640(k)).
102 Id. § 1414 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c).
103 Id. (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(c)).
104 Dodd Frank § 1414 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639c(d)-(e)).
105 Id § 1431 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1602(aa)).
106 Id. §§ 1432-33 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 1639).
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include restrictions on the type of financing that homeowners are permitted
to use within the initial CCRs or a sufficient number of homeowners could
amend the CCRs to include such restrictions.'" Thus, neighbors and home-
owners' associations could enjoin certain types of risky mortgage loans.
More importantly, they could enjoin foreclosure of a loan that did not com-
ply with CCR requirements. As a result, lenders would not be willing to
make risky loans secured by property in the community, and those that
foolishly made loans not in compliance with CCRs could be enjoined from
foreclosing by the neighbors.
Adoption of financing covenants in common-interest communities
would be a private law approach to regulating mortgage financing between
parties who are burdened with externalities caused by the foolish financing
decisions of their neighbors. While, this Article does not advocate replacing
government regulation of mortgage financing with purely private arrange-
ments, it does advocate private arrangements as a supplement to govern-
ment regulation and to fill the gaps that government regulation has left in
this realm. Government regulation is insufficient because of uncertainty
regarding its substance and its enforcement, because of a lack of flexibility
in its terms, and because it does not give control to all of the parties who
need protection.
First, government regulation is uncertain because it can change due to
politics and economic pressures.'0 In the context of mortgage loan regula-
tion, the changes are evident over the past thirty years. Various administra-
tions have encouraged more or less regulation, and economic forces have
been at work. The 1980s was a period of deregulation that led to the savings
and loan crisis. The early 2000s also was a period of deregulation based on
pressure from lenders to permit the huge increase in outstanding credit and
to permit novel forms of financing.'" More recently, regulation has in-
creased again with the enactment of Dodd Frank. A private system of fi-
nancing covenants would not be subject to politics, nor would it be as sus-
ceptible to economic pressures. Financing restrictions would typically only
be amended by a majority or supermajority of homeowners in a common-
interest community.'"
Second, government regulations, where they do exist, may not be en-
forced. Certainly, there was a lack of enforcement of regulations governing
mortgage lending as discussed above. "' A few foolish loans made by sever-
107 See infra Part IV.
108 See Susan F. French, Toward a Modern Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient Strands, 55
S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1263 n.6 (1982).
109 See William Spencer Topham, Re-Regulating "Financial Weapons of Mass Destruction,"
Observations on Repealing the Commodity Futures Modernization Act and Future Derivative Regula-
tion, 47 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 133, 133-34, 142 (2010).
110 For CCRs with financing covenants, the ability to amend with less than unanimous consent
would be essential. See infra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
111 See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
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al different lenders are unlikely to draw the attention of regulators, but a
few foreclosures can harm a community. Neighbors or a homeowners' as-
sociation could enforce a financing covenant to protect the rights of joint
venturers in a common-interest community. These parties would have an
incentive to enforce the covenant. And they could be enforced on a small
scale-against every violator.
Third, government regulations are a one-size-fits-all approach to regu-
lating home mortgage lending rather than offering a flexible approach that
depends on the circumstances. Financing covenants could be varied de-
pending on the circumstance of the common-interest community where
they are to be adopted.
Fourth, government regulation does not give control to all of the par-
ties, in this case the neighbors, injured by foolish and/or fraudulent practic-
es. The joint venturers in the common-interest community would have the
ability to control the terms of a financing covenant through the amendment
process and would have the right to enforce the financing covenant against
their neighbors and against noncompliant lenders. In order to be effective,
however, such a restriction would have to be enforceable against home-
owners and mortgagees as a covenant running with land.
III. ANALYSIS OF THE ENFORCEABILITY OF A FINANCING RESTRICTION
The traditional requirements for a covenant to run with land to benefit
and burden successor owners of lots owned by the original covenanting
parties come from English common law dating to the sixteenth century or
earlier.112 Covenants could either run at law as real covenants with damages
as the available remedy, or could run in equity as equitable servitudes en-
forced with remedies in equity."' More recently, the Restatement (Third) of
Property-Servitudes adopted an approach designed to modernize the law of
servitudes."4
Under the traditional view, a covenant runs with land at law as a real
covenant if the original parties intend for it to run, if it touches and con-
cerns land, if the jurisdiction's privity requirement is met, and if it is in
writing."' To meet the intent requirement, the parties to a covenant must
112 Much of the law of real covenants originated in Spencer's Case, (1583) 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B.).
Equitable servitudes originated in Tulk v. Moxhay, (1848) 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch.). Although Tulk
focuses only on contract rights, later cases in England recognized the equitable servitude as a new type
of covenant running with land in equity. CHASE & FORRESTER, supra note 25, at 827.
113 CHASE & FORRESTER, supra note 25, at 810; FREYERMUTH ET AL., supra note 25, at 585.
114 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro., at 3-4 (2000). The Restatement
approach is discussed infra notes 138-74 and accompanying text.
115 See Flying Diamond Oil Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 622-23 (Utah 1989);
Barner v. Chappell, 585 S.E.2d 590, 594 (Va. 2003); see also Inwood N. Homeowners' Ass'n v. Harris,
736 S.W.2d 632, 635 (Tex. 1987); Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 910-11
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intend not only that the covenant be enforceable as between the original
parties, but also that the benefit and burden run with the land. Such lan-
guage is standard in the CCRs for a common-interest community."' A fi-
nancing restriction, therefore, set forth in the declaration of CCRs, which is
in writing and recorded, and clearly states the intent to bind successors and
assigns, will meet the writing and intent requirements.
In order to run with land under the traditional view, a covenant must
touch and concern the land." 7 The effect of this "requirement is to restrict
the types of duties and liabilities that [will] burden future ownership of in-
terests in the land.""' The touch and concern requirement is vague and ob-
scure and has been used by courts to terminate covenants that the court, for
whatever reason, does not want to enforce.'
One test to determine if a covenant touches and concerns land requires
that the covenant "so affect the use, value, or enjoyment of the land itself
that it must be regarded as an integral part of the property." 20 The burdens
and benefits of the covenant must relate to the landowners' ownership in-
terest in the land, rather than merely as members of the community at
large.'2 ' If a covenant benefits the promisee personally, not benefitting land
and existing independently of it, then the covenant is personal and does not
run with the land.'22 Covenants to do, or refrain from doing, something
(Tex. 1982) (noting that "for the covenant to run with the land there must be privity of estate between
the parties to the agreement" and "that the agreement [must] touch[] and concern[] the land").
116 See Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., Inc., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983) (noting that a cove-
nant will be found to run with the land absent language that unambiguously negates that intent); Dwan
v. Indian Springs Ranch Homeowners Ass'n, 186 P.3d 1199, 1202 (Wyo. 2008). Express language in
the document usually satisfies this requirement, although courts may look to the nature and circum-
stances of the covenant in the absence of express language. See, e.g., Smalley v. Stowe Mountain Club,
LLC, 25 A.3d 539, 543 (Vt. 2011). Even if language indicating intent that the covenant run were not
included, a court could find intent based on the existence of the common-interest community as a cir-
cumstance indicating intent that the covenant run. In Smalley, the Vermont Supreme Court found the
intent requirement satisfied by a declaration ofCCRs recorded by the original developer that established
a comprehensive and uniform plan of restrictions for the creation and continuation of a high-end resi-
dential subdivision and that benefitted each lot and its owner. Id A Texas court found the parties in-
tended that a covenant run where the covenant was recorded in the deeds of all of the homeowners in the
subdivision. See Nicholls v. Barnett, 374 S.W.2d 770, 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1964). The court stated that
intent would only be lacking in this situation if there existed overwhelming evidence of a mutual mis-
take. Id.
117 Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 623.
118 Id; see also French, supra note 108, at 1289.
119 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. b; see also EDWARD H. RABIN ET
AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN PROPERTY LAW 489 (6th ed. 2011); French, supra note 108, at 1289.
120 Flying Diamond, 776 P.2d at 624 (quoting Lundeberg v. Dastrup, 497 P.2d 648, 650 (Utah
1972)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121 See id.
122 See Beeter v. Sawyer Disposal LLC, 771 N.W.2d 282, 286 (N.D. 2009); cf Roberts v. Osburn,
589 P.2d 985, 989, 991-92 (Kan. Ct. App. 1979) (holding covenant was personal because parties clearly
expressed intent that covenant was only "by the first parties" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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physical to, or on, land have generally satisfied this traditional physical use
test,'23 as have covenants to pay for the use of land or the improvement of
land.'24 As noted in the discussion of Neponsit in Part I, courts have more
often used the touch and concern requirement to prevent affirmative bur-
dens from running with land than negative covenants.'
Because the physical use test does not encompass all situations, other
tests such as Dean Bigelow's test have gained in popularity, despite some
criticism.'26 Under the Bigelow test, the burden of the covenant touches and
concerns the land if the promisor's legal interest as owner of the land is
rendered less valuable by the promise.' 7 Conversely, if the promisee's legal
interest as owner is rendered more valuable by the promise, then the benefit
of the covenant touches and concerns the land. 2 8 The court in Neponsit
applied the Bigelow test, among others, in determining that the covenant to
pay assessments did touch and concern the land.'29
123 See, e.g., Chambers v. Gallaher, 364 S.E.2d 576, 577 (Ga. 1988) (subdivision covenant prohib-
iting all business uses); Waikiki Malia Hotel, Inc. v. Kinkai Props. Ltd. P'ship, 862 P.2d 1048, 1057
(Haw. 1993) (height restriction); Hill v. Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 867 (N.M. 1996)
(interpreting restrictive covenant limiting property use to single family residence purposes).
124 See, e.g., Lake Arrowhead Cmty. Club, Inc., v. Looney, 770 P.2d 1046, 1050 (Wash. 1989) (en
bane); Rodruck v. Sand Point Maint. Comm'n, 295 P.2d 714, 721 (Wash. 1956).
125 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2 cmt. e (2000); see also supra notes 13-
14 and accompanying text.
126 The test was suggested by Dean Harry Bigelow and was later refined by Judge Charles E.
Clark. See Jeffrey E. Stake, Toward an Economic Understanding of Touch and Concern, 1988 DUKE
L.J. 925, 928-29 (1988). It has been criticized as being circular. Id. at 929.
127 See Westland Oil Dev. Corp. v. Gulf Oil Corp., 637 S.W.2d 903, 911 (Tex. 1982) (citing How-
ard R. Williams, Restrictions on the Use of Land: Covenants Running with the Land at Law, 27 TEX. L.
REV. 419, 429 (1949)) (applying the Bigelow test to find that a covenant did touch and concern the
land).
128 See id.
129 Neponsit Prop. Owners' Ass'n v. Emigrant Indus. Say. Bank, 15 N.E.2d 793, 796 (N.Y. 1938).
Other state supreme courts have applied the Bigelow Test to find covenants touched and concerned land.
The Nebraska Supreme Court, applying the test, found that a covenant to pay dues to a homeowner's
association for maintenance of a recreational facility touched and concerned land because it was "part of
a common scheme of development" and gave a right of common use to all the property owners, enhanc-
ing the value of each of their individual lots. Regency Homes Ass'n v. Egermayer, 498 N.W.2d 783,
791-93 (Neb. 1993). The New Mexico Supreme Court found that the burden of a building setback
restriction touched and concerned the promisor's land by making it less valuable, and the benefit of that
covenant touched and concerned the promisee's land by making it more valuable. Lex Pro Corp. v.
Snyder Enters., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983). Likewise, the Hawaii Supreme Court found a covenant
imposing a height restriction of buildings to clearly satisfy the touch and concern requirement.
Kaanapali Hillside Homeowners' Ass'n v. Doran, 162 P.3d 1277, 1289 (Haw. 2007). The Washington
Supreme Court found that a covenant touched and concerned the land where it created a lien against the
land for the expense of repairs. Rodruck, 295 P.2d at 721. More recently, the Washington Supreme
Court found that a covenant releasing a city from liability for damages caused by soil movement ade-
quately touched and concerned the land on the theory that "few things touch and concern land more than
the soil itself." 1515-1519 Lakeview Boulevard Condo. Ass'n v. Apartment Sales Corp., 43 P.3d 1233,
1239 (Wash. 2002) (en bane). In yet another Washington case, the court found that "an obligation to pay
MORTGAGE LOAN REGULATION
A financing restriction that limited the ways an owner could encumber
land would affect the owner as a landowner, not as a member of the com-
munity at large, and would thus touch and concern land. Furthermore, the
restriction would reduce the value of the burdened land because a lot owner
could not obtain certain types of financing, and it would increase the value
of neighbors' lots by protecting them against foolish decisions of the owner
of the restricted lot that might result in foreclosure. A restriction preventing
a mortgagee from foreclosing would most certainly reduce the value of the
mortgagee's interest in the land, and the restriction on foreclosure would
increase the value of the neighbors' lots. Thus, a court should find that a
financing restriction touches and concerns land.
The traditional approach to real covenants required both horizontal
privity, which is the relationship between the original parties to a cove-
nant,'30 and vertical privity, which is the relationship between the original
parties and their successors in ownership.'' Horizontal privity requires ei-
ther that the covenant be made in connection with a conveyance in fee be-
tween the original parties to the covenant or that the original parties have a
mutual and continuing interest in the same land.'32 Even before the Third
Restatement approach rejected the requirement of privity altogether, many
states had eliminated the requirement of horizontal privity.'33 in a common-
interest community, the horizontal privity requirement would be met by the
existence of a grantor-grantee relationship between the original developer
and each original purchaser of a lot. Thus, in any states that still require
horizontal privity, a financing restriction imposed at the initial development
of the community satisfies the requirement. A financing restriction imposed
as an amendment to an existing set of CCRs should satisfy the horizontal
assessments for the maintenance of neighborhood property touche[d] and concerne[d] the land." Lake
Arrowhead, 770 P.2d at 1050. Montana and Utah have found covenants to pay royalties to the surface
owner for oil and gas royalties underlying the land adequately touched and concerned the land. See
Farley v. Booth Bros. Land & Livestock Co., 890 P.2d 377, 382 (Mont. 1995); Flying Diamond Oil
Corp. v. Newton Sheep Co., 776 P.2d 618, 626-27 (Utah 1989).
130 See Sonoma Dev., Inc. v. Miller, 515 S.E.2d 577, 579 (Va. 1999).
131 Barner v. Chappell, 585 S.E.2d 590, 594 (Va. 2003); see also In re Foster, 435 B.R. 650, 660
n.l I (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 2010) (applying Washington law).
132 See Foster, 435 B.R. at 660 n.l 1; Kaanapali Hillside, 162 P.3d at 1289; Gallagher v. Bell, 516
A.2d 1028, 1037 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1986); Runyon v. Paley, 416 S.E.2d 177, 184-85 (N.C. 1992).
133 See Gallagher, 516 A.2d at 1037. The horizontal privity requirement serves no useful purpose
and should be eliminated. See id; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.4 cmt. b (2000).
Courts may criticize or question the continued validity of the requirement, but do not eliminate it in
cases where the requirement is met, probably because to do so would be dicta. See, e.g., Kaanapali
Hillside, 162 P.3d at 1290 n. 13 ("We express no opinion regarding the view that horizontal and mutual
privity should not be required for a covenant to run .... Rather, we only note that horizontal and mutual
privity exist here . . . ."); Lake Limerick Country Club v. Hunt Mfg. Homes, Inc., 84 P.3d 295, 302
(Wash. Ct. App. 2004) ("To whatever extent 'horizontal privity' might still be required, it is easily met
here. .. .").
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privity requirement because the CCRs would be a mutual and continuing
interest in the land.
The requirement of vertical privity is essentially an allocation device
that determines when the benefits and burdens of a covenant run to succes-
sor owners of interests in the benefitted and burdened tracts and conversely
when they do not run. The traditional approach requires strict vertical privi-
ty for a burden to run to a successor so that the burden runs only to a trans-
feree of the same estate as that held by the original covenantor.'" Thus, the
burden of the covenant would not run to a tenant of the covenantor, but
would stay with the landlord. On the benefit side, however, the traditional
approach reflects a loose vertical privity requirement so that the benefit
runs to any successor owner, even one receiving a lesser interest in the ben-
efitted property.'
For a financing restriction in a common-interest community, the bur-
den would run to successor lot owners who would have vertical privity with
their predecessor owners. The more interesting question is whether a fi-
nancing restriction limiting the rights of a mortgagee to foreclose a mort-
gage or deed of trust securing a prohibited debt could in fact run to that
mortgagee. A court applying the traditional requirement of strict vertical
privity could hold that the covenant would not run as a real covenant and
thus make the damages remedy unavailable to neighbors who tried to sue
after the fact. A court could, on the other hand, focus on the intent of the
parties and hold that the parties expressly designed the covenant to run to a
mortgagee based on a provision to that effect in the CCRs. Therefore, a
financing restriction most certainly would be enforceable against successor
owners under a traditional real covenant analysis and might be enforced
against a lender as well.
Under the traditional view, the requirements for a covenant to run with
land in equity as an equitable servitude are that the parties to the covenant
intend for it to run, it touches and concerns land, the owner of the burdened
tract has notice of the burden, and it is in writing."' The intent, touch and
concern, and writing requirements are the same as for a real covenant and
are discussed above. Recording the covenant in the real property records
satisfies the notice requirement.
Unlike a real covenant, privity is not required for the burden of an eq-
uitable servitude to run."' Thus, the burden of an equitable servitude runs to
all successor owners. Therefore, a financing restriction should be enforcea-
ble against a successor owner of a lot in the subdivision by an injunction
134 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 535 (1944).
135 See id. § 547.
136 See, e.g., Lex Pro Corp. v. Snyder Enters., 671 P.2d 637, 639 (N.M. 1983).
137 See RESTATEMENT OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 539. Under the First Restatement approach, re-
laxed vertical privity is required for the benefit to run in equity. Id. § 539 cmt. k. The benefit ofa cove-
nant limiting financing would run to neighbors both in law and in equity.
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prohibiting the forbidden financing. In addition, a covenant prohibiting
foreclosure of a lien securing forbidden financing should be enforceable by
the neighbors against a foreclosing lender. Against a lender, neighbors
would probably prefer injunctive relief instead of damages. To effectively
exercise this remedy, however, neighbors would have to be aware of the
foreclosure.
The Third Restatement eliminates the terms "real covenant" and "equi-
table servitude," and makes no distinction between them other than a histor-
ical one.' Instead, the Restatement uses the term "covenant that runs with
land."' 39 Both legal and equitable remedies are available to enforce a cove-
nant that runs with land under the Third Restatement approach.'" In order
for a covenant to run, the Restatement requires a writing that satisfies the
Statute of Frauds, 4 ' or an exception to the Statute,142 and that the parties
intend that the covenant run. 14' For a covenant limiting financing in a com-
mon-interest community, the writing and intent requirements would be sat-
isfied as discussed above. Although the Restatement does not expressly
require notice, an unrecorded covenant could be terminated by operation of
a recording act.'" A recorded declaration of CCRs satisfies the require-
ments of the recording act. In addition, a covenant will not run with land if
"it is illegal or unconstitutional or violates public policy." 45
The Third Restatement drops the requirement of privity-horizontal
privity because it serves no useful function,'" and vertical privity because it
does not provide a satisfactory method for determining the succession of
benefits and burdens of covenants.'47 The succession of the burdens and
benefits of covenants are instead addressed directly," and the rules of suc-
cession are formulated to meet the expectations of the parties to the cove-
138 RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES, § 1.4 & cmt. a (2000) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
139 Id. § 1.4 (internal quotation marks omitted); accord Hollis v. Garwall, Inc., 974 P.2d 836, 840-
41 (Wash. 1999) (en banc).
140 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 1.4 cmt. a.
141 Id. §§ 2.1, 2.7-2.8.
142 Id. §§ 2.1, 2.8-2.9, 2.14; see also PMZ Oil Co. v. Lucroy, 449 So. 2d 201, 208 (Miss. 1984)
(equitable estoppel); Remilong v. Crolla, 576 P.2d 461, 465 (Wyo. 1978) (same).
143 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.2. The intent required is that either the
benefit or the burden runs with land. Id. § 2.2 cmt. i.
144 Id § 7.14; see also Witter v. Taggart, 577 N.E.2d 338, 341 (N.Y. 1991).
145 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 & cmt. g; see also Davidson Bros. v.
D. Katz & Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 294 (N.J. 1990); Orange & Rockland Utils., Inc. v. Philwold Es-
tates, Inc., 418 N.E.2d 1310, 1315 (N.Y. 1981) (enforcement of restriction that limited use of land to
legally impossible use would violate public policy).
146 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 2.4 cmt. b. Formality requirements are cov-
ered in the Statute of Frauds and recording acts. Id.
147 Id. ch. 5 intro. note, at 5; see also id. § 5.2 cmt. b.
148 Id. § 5.2 cmt b.
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nant and their successors.'49 Section 5.2 of the Restatement provides: "Ex-
cept as otherwise provided by the terms of the servitude .. . an appurtenant
benefit or burden runs to all subsequent owners and possessors of the bene-
fited and burdened property."' Thus, the Restatement gives the parties "the
freedom to specify the persons to whom the benefits and burdens may be
transferred."' 5
Therefore, under the Restatement approach, the parties should be able
to specify that the burden of a covenant will run both to successor owners
of the fee and to mortgage lenders, with the owner prohibited from obtain-
ing certain types of financing and the lender prohibited from foreclosing on
a noncompliant loan.152 Furthermore, either damages or equitable relief
should be available against both the owner and the lender. Section 5.2(1)
provides that a burden will not run to a party with title superior to that of
the servitude creator. 15 Thus, a mortgagee with a lien senior to the covenant
would not be bound by it, as would be expected.
Finally, the Third Restatement requires that a covenant not be "illegal
or unconstitutional or violate[] public policy,"' 54 as a more logical and rea-
soned replacement for the old touch and concern requirement."' A financ-
ing restriction would not be illegal,'5 ' nor would it be unconstitutional.'"
149 See id. ch. 5 intro. note, at 6.
150 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 5.2. Appurtenant benefits and burdens pass
automatically. Id. § 5.1; see also Sun Valley Ctr. for Arts & Humanities, Inc. v. Sun Valley Co., 690
P.2d 346, 348 (Idaho 1984) (appurtenant burdens pass automatically); Orange & Rockland, 418 N.E.2d
at 1313-14 (appurtenant benefits pass automatically).
151 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 5.1 cmt. a ("[T]he parties are free to create
servitudes as they see fit so long as they .. . do not violate public policy.").
152 The Third Restatement contemplates "[c]omplex servitudes with multiple and varied succes-
sors," including covenants that run to lending institutions. Id. § 5.1 cmt. c (emphasis omitted).
153 Id. § 5.2(1); see also Springmont Homeowners Ass'n v. Barber, 472 S.E.2d 695, 696-97 (Ga.
Ct. App. 1996) (stating that purchaser of foreclosed lots not bound by architectural-control covenants
created and recorded subsequent to mortgage); Citicorp Say. of Ill. v. Bhatti, 527 N.E.2d 424, 426 (111.
App. Ct. 1988) (foreclosing mortgagee takes free of assessments levied individually on foreclosed
property before possession).
154 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1; see also Davidson Bros. v. D. Katz &
Sons, Inc., 579 A.2d 288, 303-04 (N.J. 1990); Orange & Rockland, 418 N.E.2d at 1315 (holding that
enforcement of restriction that limited use of land to legally impossible use would violate public policy).
155 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.2. The touch and concern requirement
"provid[ed] courts with a flexible, discretionary power to disallow and terminate servitudes." Id § 3.2
cmt. b. But the Third Restatement has adopted a more straightforward approach. Id. § 3.2 cmt. a.
156 "An illegal servitude ... is one that is prohibited by a statute or governmental regulation." Id.
§ 3.1 cmt. c. See infra notes 169-74 and accompanying text for a discussion of the Fair Housing Act.
One comment at the AALS program was that a financing restriction would in some way violate the
Garn-St. Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982) (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.). The authors disagree. The Garn-St. Germain Act
provides that "a lender may not exercise its option pursuant to a due-on-sale clause upon-(1) the crea-
tion of a lien or other encumbrance subordinate to the lender's security instrument which does not relate
to a transfer of rights of occupancy in the property." 12 U.S.C. § 1701j-3(d) (2006). This section applies
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The public policy requirement, however, could create a constraint on the
ability to create too restrictive a financing limitation. The Restatement
elaborates on the violation of the public policy requirement by providing
that it would invalidate, among other things, "a servitude that is arbitrary,
spiteful, or capricious; ... imposes an unreasonable restraint on alienation .
.; [or] is unconscionable."' Public policy that may invalidate a covenant
is based on judicial determination as well as legislative or constitutional
provisions.'" In determining whether a covenant violates public policy,
courts should balance the benefit of enforcing the covenant against the
harm." However, courts should also consider the freedom of parties to
consent to the adverse consequences of a covenant.''
A reasonable limitation on financing should not run afoul of the public
policy requirement, but the requirement would create a limit on the type of
restriction that could be imposed. A covenant limiting financing would not
ordinarily be arbitrary, spiteful, or capricious if it protected neighbors from
to a lender's enforcement of a due-on-sale clause and would not prohibit restrictions on mortgage loans
enforced by neighbors or a homeowners' association. The Parity Act, enacted as a part of the Garn-
St. Germain Act, preempts state regulation of alternative mortgage transactions. See supra notes 61-63
and accompanying text. As amended by Dodd Frank, the Parity Act defines "alternative mortgage
transaction" as "a loan or credit sale secured by an interest in residential real property ... in which the
interest rate or finance charge may be adjusted or renegotiated . . . described and defined by applicable
regulation." Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 3802(1)). The Parity
Act provides:
An alternative mortgage transaction may be made by a housing creditor in accordance with
this section, notwithstanding any State constitution, law, or regulation that prohibits an alter-
native mortgage transaction. For purposes of this subsection, a State constitution, law, or
regulation that prohibits an alternative mortgage transaction does not include any State con-
stitution, law, or regulation that regulates mortgage transactions generally, including any re-
striction on prepayment penalties or late charges.
Id. § 1083(c), 124 Stat. at 2081 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. § 3803(c)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Even if enforcement by courts of a private financing restriction were treated as a
"State ... law ... that prohibits" certain financing, the financing restriction proposed in Part V does not
prohibit ARMs and, thus, could not run afoul of the Parity Act as amended by Dodd Frank. See id.
157 "A servitude may be invalid because it impermissibly infringes rights protected by the applica-
ble state constitution or by the United States Constitution." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.:
SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. d.
158 Id. §3.1.
159 Id. § 3.1 cmt. f; see also Martin v. Constance, 843 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D. Mo. 1994) (inval-
idating covenant that buildings were only to be used as private residences as applied to six mentally
disabled persons after considering legislative history of Fair Housing Act); Bennett v. Comm'r of Food
& Agric., 576 N.E.2d 1365, 1367-68 (Mass. 1991) (including additional restriction in statutory defini-
tion that reinforced a legislatively stated public purpose).
160 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i; see also Malcolm v. Shamie, 290
N.W.2d 101, 102, 104 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980) (balancing competing policies of protecting valuable
property and developing quality facilities for the mentally handicapped); Crowell v. Shelton, 948 P.2d
313, 316 (Okla. 1997) (holding that a court must balance the equities if it finds restrictions unreasona-
ble).
161 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 cmt. i.
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foreclosures resulting from foolish financing decisions.162 But one can im-
agine a covenant, such as one prohibiting financing from a particular insti-
tution against which a developer holds a grudge, that would be spiteful, or
others that might be arbitrary and capricious. The Restatement approach
would prevent enforcement of such a covenant.
A reasonable covenant limiting financing terms should not be invali-
dated as an unreasonable restraint on alienation. The Restatement requires
that a direct restraint on alienation be reasonable, with reasonableness "de-
termined by weighing the utility of the restraint against the injurious conse-
quences of enforcing" it.'6 A direct restraint is one that prohibits some type
of transfer," and a limitation on financing could be seen as a prohibition on
transfer of any lien that does not satisfy the requirements of the covenant. A
consideration in determining reasonableness is the nature of the property
interest affected, with greater restraints justified for nonpossessory inter-
ests,' such as a lien in this case. The utility of such a covenant would be
great for homeowners protected from the foolish financing decisions of
their neighbors that could result in foreclosed and empty properties in the
community. The consequences of enforcing it against a homeowner include
preventing a homeowner from entering into a risky loan, arguably a benefit
to the homeowner if you take a paternalistic view. The consequences of
enforcing it against a lender are entirely avoidable if the lender complies
with the terms of the covenant in the first place.
If the covenant is treated as an indirect restraint on alienation," it is
invalid only if it "lacks a rational justification."'67 The justification of pro-
162 The Restatement elaborates on these terms as follows:
Arbitrary normally means that the purpose is not legitimate, or that the means adopted have
no reasonable relationship to accomplishment of the purpose. Spiteful means that the primary
purpose of the servitude was to cause harm to another, rather than to secure a benefit to the
creating party or parties. Capricious generally means that no legitimate purpose for creating
the servitude is discernible.
Id. § 3.1 cmt. g.
163 Id. § 3.4.
164 Id § 3.4 cmt. b; see also Spanish Oaks, Inc. v. Hy-Vee, Inc., 655 N.W.2d 390, 399 (Neb. 2003)
("A direct restraint on alienation is a provision in a deed, will, contract, or other instrument which, by its
express terms, or by implication of fact, purports to prohibit or penalize the exercise of the power of
alienation.").
165 See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.4 cmt. b.
166 Indirect restraints are those that reduce the value of property or reduce its desirability to pro-
spective purchasers. Id; see also Lamar Adver. v. Larry & Vickie Nicholls, L.L.C., 213 P.3d 641, 644
(Wyo. 2009) ("An indirect restraint on alienation 'arises when an attempt is made to accomplish some
purpose other than the restraint of alienability, but with the incidental result that the instrument, if valid,
would restrain practical alienability."' (quoting Smith v. Osguthorpe, 58 P.3d 854, 860 (Utah Ct. App.
2002))). A restriction on financing could reduce the value of property by reducing the number of eligible
purchasers. However, because the covenant would be part of a scheme of identical covenants made by




tecting neighbors from foolish financing decisions that could result in fore-
closure is certainly rational. Finally, a reasonable covenant limiting financ-
ing is not unconscionable.
While a reasonable limit on financing terms should easily pass the
public policy requirement, the requirement would impose a limit on the
ability of a developer or homeowners to unduly restrict financing options.
The Restatement approach is not intended to require reasonableness in the
broad sense of having courts substitute their judgment for that of the parties
to the covenant but rather in the narrow sense of invalidating a covenant
"only if it is arbitrary or capricious, serves no legitimate purpose, or denies
fundamental constitutional rights."'" In this context, the Restatement simp-
ly prevents a type of covenant that crosses that line.
A possible public policy argument against a financing restriction
would be that it could be exclusionary. However, a reasonable financing
restriction would be no more exclusionary than many provisions of CCRs
in common-interest communities that make them more expensive-such as
provisions requiring large homes, brick exteriors, or payment of homeown-
ers' association dues. Courts have applied the Fair Housing Act"' to prohib-
it zoning regulations that exclude low-income housing on the basis of the
disparate impact on persons of color shown by statistical evidence.'o Courts
have also applied the Act to prohibit the application of restrictive covenants
to prevent group homes.17
The Fair Housing Act has not been applied to prohibit enforcement of
restrictive covenants that make homes in a particular common-interest
community more expensive. In housing discrimination cases against a pri-
vate defendant, a plaintiff "may establish his prima facie case by proving
the following facts: (1) that he is [a member of a protected class]; (2) that
he applied for and was qualified to rent or purchase the housing; (3) that he
167 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.5(2). Given that Comment c to § 3.5(2)
describes "quarter sales," which would require a purchaser to pay a portion of the subsequent sale price
to a seller, as possibly having a rational justification that would allow such restrictions to be enforceable,
there should be little question that a financing restriction such as that set forth below should be found to
have a rational justification and be enforceable. Id. § 3.5 cmt. c (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
168 Id. § 3.1 cmt. j; see also Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass'n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1290 (Cal.
1994) (en banc).
169 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619, 3631 (2006).
170 See NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 F.2d 926, 937-38 (2d Cir. 1988) ("[T]he dispropor-
tionate harm to blacks and the segregative impact on the entire community resulting from the refusal to
rezone create a strong prima facie showing of discriminatory effect."); United States v. City of Black
Jack, 508 F.2d 1179, 1184-85 (8th Cir.1974); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 556-57
(N.D. Tex. 2000).
171 See generally United States v. Wagner, 930 F. Supp. 1148 (N.D. Tex. 1996). See also Hill v.
Cmty. of Damien of Molokai, 911 P.2d 861, 867 (N.M. 1996).
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was rejected; and (4) that the housing opportunity remained available."'7 2
This standard requires a showing that a purchaser is "qualified
to ... purchase" and thus can afford the housing." Courts have not prohib-
ited exclusion on economic grounds.17 4
A financing restriction should never be used as a method of excluding
persons of color. The purpose of the covenant proposed in this Article is to
require homeowners and lenders, without regard to race, to act in a finan-
cially responsible manner because market forces no longer create the incen-
tives in lenders to make financially responsible loans. Therefore, it should
not be illegal or in violation of public policy.
IV. PRACTICAL CHALLENGES TO FINANCING RESTRICTIONS
What are the practical challenges to implementing the financing re-
striction concept in common-interest communities? Is it just a nice concept
that is legally enforceable for the reasons discussed in the preceding Part
but unlikely to gain any traction in the real world? While there are many
obstacles to the adoption of financing restrictions in a significant number of
common-interest communities, recent experiences have tilled the soil so
that the seeds of the financing restriction concept can take root and flourish.
A. Developer Resistance To Financing Restrictions in New Developments
One of the challenges to the integration of a financing restriction into
new developments might be resistance among developers to a restriction
that clearly limits the universe of prospective buyers. Developers may per-
ceive the use of a financing restriction as decreasing demand and therefore
diminishing both the price that lots or houses may sell for in the develop-
ment and the time period in which the parcels are sold. "'
172 Robinson v. 12 Lofts Realty, Inc., 610 F.2d 1032, 1038 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)).
173 id.
174 See Williams v. 5300 Columbia Pike Corp., 891 F. Supp. 1169, 1180 n.23 (E.D. Va. 1995)
("[D]efendant must prevail if it appears that the disparity was attributable to economic inequality rather
than impermissible discrimination."); see also Dreher v. Rana Mgmt., Inc., 493 F. Supp. 930, 931-35
(E.D.N.Y. 1980) (granting defendant summary judgment in suit by tenants seeking to enjoin landlord
from converting building 90 percent occupied by black tenants to housing for college students, most of
whom would be white).
175 See supra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing why financing restrictions were not
drafted into CCRs by developers back in the 1960s and 1970s); see also Schill et al., supra note 30, at
283-84 (discussing decreased demand for cooperatives because of the financing conditions and the
unwillingness of some purchasers to be subjected to financial scrutiny).
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This perspective among developers could continue to make developers
reluctant to insert financing restrictions in CCRs. But given the recent re-
trenchment in the real estate marketplace, with widespread foreclosures
resulting from overleveraged properties triggering diminished property val-
ues and unpaid assessments in common-interest communities across the
country,'7 ' a growing population of prospective purchasers may find financ-
ing restrictions to be an attractive feature within CCRs. These purchasers
will value financing restrictions because they protect against foreclosure
epidemics that both impact neighboring property values directly and cause
indirect problems resulting from unpaid assessments on foreclosed par-
cels.'77 Moreover, it is conceivable that some lenders will begin requiring
financing restrictions or encouraging the use of financing restrictions as a
means of reducing risk to the underlying collateral for home mortgages.'7 1
Thus, some developers may view, or be encouraged to view, the use of fi-
nancing restrictions as a market advantage.
B. Amending Existing Common-Interest Community Regimes
Of course, developer resistance is only a problem in new develop-
ments in which the developer is drafting the CCRs. The near future does not
seem likely to involve a dramatic increase in new developments, given the
current housing market and the relatively modest number of new housing
starts compared to historical volumes. 179
176 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing the impact of the mortgage crisis on
common-interest communities).
177 See supra notes 23-24 and accompanying text (discussing how rampant foreclosures directly
diminish the value of neighboring parcels and indirectly diminish the value of neighboring parcels in
common-interest communities because of the growth in unpaid assessments that results in diminished
maintenance).
178 See Joe Del Casino, Home Buyer Beware in Distressed Market, SUN-SENTINEL (FLA.) (Sept.
21, 2008), http://articles.sun-sentinel.com/2008-09-21/news/0809180157_1 lenders-foreclosures-prices;
10 Things A Homeowners Association Won't Tell You, YAHOO! FIN., http://loan.yahoo.com/m/
primerl3.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2012) (noting that banks are wary of lending when a common-
interest community has a significant percentage of unpaid assessments or is in litigation regarding
unpaid assessments). If lenders are going to pay attention to the volume of unpaid assessments and how
that might impact land values within a common-interest community, it would not be surprising if the
lenders also began asking for financing restrictions (just as the securitized market resulted in the increas-
ingly frequent inclusion of amendment provisions in CCRs). See supra note 43 and accompanying text
(discussing how the secondary mortgage market drove some of the language development in CCRs). Of
course, lenders might not be excited about financing restrictions that function to preclude foreclosure of
mortgages that violate the financing restriction. Significant lender resistance would prevent financing
restrictions from gaining traction in the marketplace. We discuss this challenge infra note 186 and
accompanying text.
179 With occasional significant fluctuations, housing starts averaged about 1.5 to 1.6 million per
year between 1960 and 2000, but from 2000 to 2006, housing starts consistently increased from 1.5
million per year to well over 2 million per year, only to plummet back below I million per year as of
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Nonetheless, with 300,000 common-interest communities already in
existence, there is probably much more room for growth in the use of fi-
nancmg restrictions among existing common-interest community regimes
that might consider amending their CCRs by adopting a tool that might
reduce the risk of foreclosure epidemics in the future. Here the dynamics
are much different because, generally speaking, in most existing common-
interest communities, the developer is not in the picture anymore.'" But for
existing common-interest communities, there are still some challenges to
the implementation of a financing restriction. The following challenges
make up the remainder of this Part of the Article. First, is there an amend-
ment provision in the CCRs? Second, are enough existing homeowners
within the common-interest community likely to find a financing restriction
attractive enough to vote to amend the CCR regime by adding a financing
restriction? Finally, how should the financing restriction impact existing
homeowners who may have trouble complying with the restriction were
they to refinance?
In the absence of an amendment provision, the CCRs for a common-
interest community can be amended only if all homeowners in the commu-
nity unanimously agree.'"' It is very unlikely that all homeowners in a
common-interest community will unanimously agree to amend CCRs to
2008. CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE OUTLOOK FOR HOUSING STARTS, 2009-2012, at 2 fig. 1 (2008),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/publication/20375 (follow "Document"). With housing starts projected
to be below the long-term average for the next few years as excess inventory of vacant and foreclosed
houses are worked through the system, the annual supply of new housing stock reflects only about one
percent of all housing stock in the country. See id. at 21-23 (discussing three scenarios, from optimistic
to pessimistic).
180 As discussed in Neponsit, once a development is completed, the responsibility for ongoing
management of common amenities is with the residents, generally functioning through a homeowners'
association. In reality, however, given the mortgage crisis impact on the housing market, there probably
are a significant number of existing common-interest communities that were begun in 2005 through
2007 and have lost momentum with developers (or their lenders!) still owning a significant number of
lots and quite possibly the power to amend the CCRs unilaterally. See, e.g., J. Craig Anderson, Unfin-
ished Subdivisions Grinding To a Halt, ARIZ. REPUBLIC (June 18, 2008, 12:00 AM),
http://www.azcentral.com/arizonarepublic/news/articles/0618biz-trendhomes06l8.html?&wired (de-
scribing subdivision with hundreds of vacant lots in foreclosure); Molly Loomis, Boom and Bust: Re-
shaping Development Patterns in Teton Valley, NEW W. (Mar. 23, 2011), http://www.newwest.net/
topic/article/boom and bust reshapingdevelopment patterns in tetonvalley/C35/L35/ (noting that
there are over 7,700 vacant lots in a -community of only 8,000 people); see also Franzese & Siegel,
supra note 15, at 1127 (discussing common-interest communities in which the developer retains signifi-
cant control over the CCRs prior to the sale of a significant number of the lots in the development).
181 Because covenants are property rights defined by the terms of the CCR regime in place for a
given development, the beginning premise is that all owners of the property right must consent to any
changes in the property right unless the CCR regime specifically sets forth an amendment process that
may function without unanimous consent. Even with an amendment procedure, however, there are
different lines of cases regarding whether amendments may only change existing covenants or may
include new covenants. See Evergreen Highlands Ass'n v. West, 73 P.3d 1, 4-6 (Colo. 2003) (en banc)
(discussing two different lines of cases).
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impose a financing restriction unless the group of homeowners is relatively
small. The larger the group the more difficult it will be to get unanimous
agreement.
Assuming there is an amendment provision, the next question will be
what type of majority is required for amendment-a simple majority or a
super majority.'82 Again, it will be easier to accomplish an amendment with
a simple majority requirement than with a super-majority requirement. Giv-
en the turmoil caused by foreclosures and unpaid assessments, one can easi-
ly imagine that association boards or individuals within a common-interest
community might view a financing restriction as a reasonable means by
which to constrain their joint venturers from excessively leveraging their
homes. Individual homeowners, however, might have the same reluctance
to embrace a financing restriction as developers, concerned that a financing
restriction might reduce the population of qualified purchasers such that the
value of the home declines.' This will be a question that may get resolved
differently in different common-interest communities around the country
and even differently within a state or a region. Different outcomes will de-
pend on how the issue is presented, what experience those in the common-
interest community had with foreclosures, and the extent to which they per-
ceive the concept of a financing restriction as a reasonable constraint on
themselves and others. If, as noted above, lending institutions begin to look
more favorably upon purchasers in common-interest communities with fi-
nancing restrictions, market pressure could make the use of financing re-
strictions even more attractive.
Finally, common-interest communities considering amending their
CCRs to impose a financing restriction likely will face one more implemen-
tation challenge-what to do with existing homeowners who have little
equity in their homes or are even underwater on their mortgages. In many
common-interest communities around the country, relatively conservative
homeowners who did not purchase with excessive leverage or did not en-
gage in a refinancing that resulted in excessive leverage nonetheless may
182 While many common-interest communities allow amendment based on a simple majority, see,
for example, Andrews v. Sandpiper Villagers, Inc., 170 P.3d 1098, 1100 (Or. Ct. App. 2007), some
require a super-majority vote of 67 percent, 75 percent, or more to amend the underlying covenant
regime. See, e.g., Regency Homes Ass'n v. Schrier, 759 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Neb. 2009) (noting amend-
ment process requiring three-quarters of members for approval); Boulder Oaks Cmty. Ass'n v. B & J
Andrews Enters., 215 P.3d 27, 29-30 (Nev. 2009) (per curiam) (describing amendment process requiring
67 percent of members); Hawkins View Architectural Control Comm. v. Cooper, 250 P.3d 380, 384
(Or. Ct. App. 2011) (describing amendment process requiring approval of 85 percent of homeowners).
183 At some level, homeowners' receptivity to a financing restriction will be a function of the
extent to which homeowners are concerned about maintaining long-term value or are interested in
facilitating maximum short-term appreciation. Those interested in maintaining long-term value likely
would support a financing restriction; those interested in maximizing short-term appreciation would
likely prefer to foster the possibility of excessive leverage which can drive up property values in the
short-term.
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presently find themselves "upside down" or "underwater." These are home-
owners who have been paying their mortgages on time each month and
continue to do so even though the mortgage crisis and resulting recession
and epidemic of foreclosures has resulted in such a depreciation in property
values in their neighborhood or region that they now have an outstanding
mortgage balance that exceeds, or nearly exceeds, the value of their home.
Any reasonably-sized common-interest community is likely to have a num-
ber of homeowners who fit this description. While it is conceivable that
banks holding title to foreclosed properties and homeowners who are un-
derwater would oppose an amendment that would impose a financing re-
striction, if they are not sufficiently numerous to defeat an amendment, then
the association will have an implementation question regarding how to han-
dle those homeowners. First, any financing restriction amendment should
apply only prospectively to new "financing" actions-the sale of a property
in the common-interest community or a new refinancing of a property in the
community. But even with prospective application, owners without suffi-
cient equity would be hamstrung by a financing restriction that would not
allow them to benefit from an advantageous refinancing opportunity that
may provide them with a lower interest rate, lower payments, and thus
greater financial security. With this in mind, a financing restriction should
allow homeowners to refinance without regard to loan-to-value ratio pro-
vided they are refinancing an amount no greater than their current balance
plus closing costs.
Many challenges exist that may preclude the widespread adoption of a
financing restriction. But in a marketplace with a variety of housing options
at a variety of price points and with a variety of amenities, it would seem
possible that some sets of like-minded homeowners might come together to
constrain themselves from excessive financial risk-taking associated with
borrowing against their homes within a common-interest community.
V. PROPOSED FINANCING RESTRICTION
The goal of the financing restriction is simple-to reduce significantly
the likelihood of foreclosure by constraining homeowners from being ex-
cessively leveraged or obtaining home mortgage loans that they cannot af-
ford to repay. To be effective, the financing restriction should both prohibit
homeowners from being excessively leveraged and compel lenders to pay
attention to and abide by the financing restriction. Thus, even if a lender is
willing to make a loan to a borrower without the ability to repay or with
little equity in the property, the financing restriction should function to dis-
courage a lender from doing so.
Excessive leverage does not need to be anything out of the ordinary.
Most conventional mortgages are available without private mortgage insur-
ance so long as the loan to value ratio is 80 percent. While that seems to be
a fairly reasonable "market-defined" parameter for thinking about the tip-
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ping point between appropriate leverage and excessive leverage, a little
more flexibility may be helpful to make sure the concept of a financing
restriction is palatable to more homeowners, developers, and lenders. Al-
though each common-interest community can decide its own risk tolerance
and set its loan-to-value ratio accordingly, the draft financing restriction set
forth below places the loan-to-value threshold at 90 percent, in an attempt
to balance accessibility in the market with protection against excessive lev-
erage. "
In addition, it makes sense to require the lender wishing to enforce the
mortgage to comply with Section 1411 of Dodd-Frank (requiring lenders to
determine the borrower's ability to repay). Borrowers have a defense to
foreclosure if a lender fails to comply with Section 1411 of Dodd-Frank,
and the neighbors should also.
The financing restriction language that might work best to accomplish
these goals is as follows:
Purchaser, on behalf of herself and her successors and assigns, including but not limited
to mortgagees, agrees:
1. The first lien purchase money mortgage used to acquire the Property and for which the
Property is security may not exceed 90 percent of the lesser of the purchase price of the
Property or the appraised value of the Property used for purposes of obtaining the purchase
money mortgage. Furthermore, any second mortgage, home equity loan, or other financing
secured by the Property and consummated in connection with the purchase of the Property
may not cause the total amount of debt secured by the Property to exceed 90 percent of the
lesser of the purchase price of the Property or the appraised value of the Property used for
purposes of obtaining the first lien purchase money mortgage. Following purchase, the total
amount Purchaser or her successors and assigns may borrow against the value of the Proper-
ty, regardless of whether the borrowing is done through a refinance mortgage, a second
mortgage, a home equity loan, negative amortization of existing financing, or some other fi-
nancing secured by the Property, may not exceed 90 percent of the fair market value of the
Property at the time the loan is consummated. Notwithstanding the foregoing, an existing
loan or loans secured by a lien on the Property may be refinanced in an amount not to exceed
the balance of such loans on the date of refinancing plus closing costs for refinancing.
In determining fair market value, a lender may conclusively rely on the value estimate in
an appraisal or evaluation prepared within 90 days of the date the loan is consummated in ac-
cordance with a state or federal requirement applicable to a loan of the type being made. In
the event no appraisal is obtained in connection with a loan, a lender, at the lender's option,
shall be entitled to rely on the value determined by the taxing authority for purposes of as-
sessing ad valorem taxes on the Property.
This restriction shall not apply to a) a loan for work and materials used in constructing
improvements on the Property, or b) a reverse mortgage that requires no payment of princi-
pal or interest until (i) all borrowers have died; (ii) the Property is sold or otherwise trans-
ferred; (iii) all borrowers cease occupying the Property for a period of longer than 12 con-
secutive months without prior written approval from the lender; (iv) the borrower defaults on
an obligation specified in the loan documents to repair and maintain, pay taxes and assess-
ments on, or insure the Property; (v) the borrower commits actual fraud in connection with
the loan; or (vi) the borrower fails to maintain the priority of the lender's lien on the Property.
184 Another option would be to have different loan-to-value requirements for purchase of a home
and for subsequent borrowing against the home-e.g., 90 percent for purchase and 80 percent for subse-
quent borrowing or 95 percent for purchase and 90 percent for subsequent borrowing. This would make
homes in the common-interest community more accessible for purchase, but protect equity to a greater
extent once it is established.
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2. No lender may make a purchase money mortgage, a refinancing mortgage, a second
mortgage, a home equity loan, or other financing for which the Property will serve as securi-
ty unless the lender makes a reasonable and good faith determination based on verified and
documented information that, at the time the loan is consummated, the borrower has a rea-
sonable ability to repay the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance
(including mortgage guarantee insurance), and assessments. In determining whether the bor-
rower has a reasonable ability to repay, a lender may rely on the criteria set forth in 15
U.S.C. § 1639c(a) and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto.
3. If a lender provides a purchase money mortgage, a second mortgage, a home equity
loan, or other financing for which the Property will serve as security in violation of these re-
strictions, the lender hereby waives any right to seek foreclosure of the Property to satisfy the
loan made in violation of these restrictions.
This restriction constrains the extent to which the homeowner can use
her home as security against which to borrow. It also constrains lenders and
should function to discourage lenders from lending to homeowners if the
loan will result in a total set of encumbrances with a loan-to-value ratio in
excess of 90 percent or lending to homeowners without the ability to repay.
It provides an exception for homeowners who lose equity due to deprecia-
tion rather than excessive borrowing so that these homeowners can still
refinance their loans to take advantage of lower interest rates. It excludes
construction and home improvement loans because they increase the value
of the property as construction proceeds, and also excludes reverse mort-
gages that do not become due until the homeowner dies, sells the home, or
moves.15
The financing restriction would be relatively efficient as it would not
require the implementation of a "financial review committee" within the
homeowners' association of a common-interest community (as might exist
within a cooperative), but would be self-effectuating. The financing re-
striction, on its face, should function to deter lenders or mortgage origina-
tors seeking to make money by extending risky loans which they intend to
release into the secondary market. The secondary market likely will not
countenance mortgages that were made in violation of this type of financing
restriction because of the inability to foreclose on borrowers who received a
loan that violated this financing restriction. 181
That said, if the homeowners' association wanted to be even more cau-
tious, it could require a purchaser or refinancing homeowner to provide to a
"financial review committee" the loan documents and the purchase price
185 The reverse mortgage requirements are borrowed from the Texas Constitution. See TEX.
CONST. art. 16, § 50(k)(6).
186 While some may believe lenders will be reluctant to lend at all with a financing restriction in
place because of the risk of inadvertent violation that results in a loss of a right to foreclose, the financ-
ing restriction contains a safe harbor to protect lenders who have a qualifying appraisal or tax assess-
ment on which they rely in making a loan. Moreover, similar concerns were expressed when Texas
amended its constitution to permit home equity loans for the first time, but required an 80 percent loan-




and/or appraisal for the committee to confirm compliance with the financ-
ing restriction. Notably, even this process would be less intrusive and in-
volve much less discretion in the review committee than what is common in
cooperatives.
This financing restriction would not be a panacea, as it does not pre-
clude homeowners within a common-interest community from being exces-
sively leveraged through credit cards or educational loans that are not se-
cured by their homes. It also does not protect against decreasing property
values caused by economic conditions outside the common-interest com-
munity. Thus, some risk of foreclosure will still remain. But the financing
restriction would greatly reduce the risk of foreclosure that has been mani-
fested significantly during this economic downturn-the risk of foreclosure
from having borrowed 95 percent, 100 percent, or 125 percent of the value
of one's home in a market poised for price deflation or from borrowing
without the ability to repay from the outset.
CONCLUSION
Since the Neponsit decision over seven decades ago, the desire of
homeowners to have the benefits of being in common-interest communities,
with CCRs regulating their use of their land and mandating contributions to
common amenities, has grown substantially. For the millions of homeown-
ers now residing in the more than 300,000 common-interest communities
across the United States, however, the CCRs, which are designed to pre-
serve property values, provided no meaningful support against plummeting
property values resulting from the mortgage crisis. One reason that com-
mon-interest communities have been susceptible to the "boom-bust" real
estate cycle has been the absence of any restriction on how homeowners
within common-interest communities use their property as security for fi-
nancial obligations. In a relatively unregulated environment, many home-
owners engaged in risky financial decisions, taking out loans secured by
their property that exceeded or nearly exceeded the value of their property
and/or taking out loans secured by their property that they had little pro-
spect of repaying. While this "unregulated" environment facilitated above-
average appreciation in property values over several years, when the hous-
ing appreciation of the late 1990s and early 2000s finally peaked and began
to subside, the fragile state of the housing market was exposed, resulting in
the mortgage crisis and foreclosure epidemic that has decimated the equity
of many homeowners and impaired the financial viability of many com-
mon-interest communities that have common amenities to maintain.
Given that the public law regulatory environment was inadequate to
prevent this financial crisis, a private law response may be necessary to
prevent similar problems in the future. Were developers and common-
interest communities to embrace a financing restriction such as that set
forth in this Article, the restriction would constrain homeowners from ex-
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cessively leveraging their properties to their detriment and that of their
neighbors and would constrain lenders from making such loans. While
some practical challenges may hinder the widespread adoption of financing
restrictions, there are no meaningful legal constraints. The financing re-
striction should be enforceable against homeowners, their successors and
assigns, including mortgage lenders, under a traditional common law analy-
sis and under the Restatement (Third) of Property-Servitudes. If drafted
carefully, the financing restriction may be perceived as attractive by devel-
opers and homeowners who have a more conservative orientation to the
"investment" aspect owning a home-those interested in maintaining long-
term value rather than maximizing short-term appreciation.
